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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
By 0. H. THORMODSGARD AND ROGER D. MOORE*
IN GENERAL
International Law, as a body of rules regulating relations between
states, must as law be concerned with facts and not hypotheses existing
in the international world. From the standpoint of such law, a state
logically assumes its relative position among other states according to
its conformity with the international standards of statehood. Further-
more, courts of the various states in considering the ramifications flow-
ing from the life of other states, must, as courts, be concerned with the
facts of such life.'
When the political department charged with the conduction of the
foreign affairs of a government has given assurance by expression or
implication to a new state in its exercise of the attributes of sovereignty,
the courts as part of the same government need go no farther for
proof of the new state's existence. But, when the political depart-
ment has refused or neglected to give such assurance, and so to af-
ford "recognition," the courts- pressed by the obvious need for intra-
governmental co-ordination on the one hand, and by their basic obliga-
tion not to disregard the equitable and legal rights of persons and states
on the other-must decide each case upon its particular merits in the
light of all of its facts.
Such facts as interstate commerce and trade, the migration and
naturalization of nationals, the exchange of mails, public notoriety of
existing conditions, and particularly actual recognition of new govern-
ments by other well-established governments, cannot be overlooked in
the judicial determination of the international situation of statehood.
If the political department expressly disclaim the existence of a new
government when in fact such a government does exist, there may
very probably result legal miscarriage and equitable dilemma from
which only a change in executive policy can bring extrication. If, on
the other hand, political non-recognition constitutes basically a mere
refusal to deal diplomatically with the new government, the courts may
*0. H. Thormodsgard, M.A., J.D., Associate Professor of Law, University
of North Dakota.
Roger D. Moore, B.S., A.M., Assistant in Political Science, Washington
University.
1
"So-Called De-Facto Recognition"-Thomas Baty, 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL
465. See also "The Juristic Status of Foreign States, Their Property and Their
Acts"--Osward K. Fraenkel, 25 COLUMBIA REviEw 544.
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act much more normally to substantiate such a policy of political non-
intercourse without jeopardizing at the same time the rights and best
interests of the persons concerned in the forum.2
Statehood is grounded in supreme civil authority of reasonable sta-
bility, established over a certain territory. When, in the international
world, a government is reduced to impotency, that government must be
considered as having ceased to exist in law as well as fact; the new
government, if it be actually obeyed within the territory that it claims,
is the only government that can be considered, for, even tho it be the
usurper of a former sovereign, it does in fact go to make up a complete
state. When, as the result of an insurrection, a part of a recognized
state has broken away and established itself separate from the old, the
new international entity may safely be considered as forming a state
as soon as it becomes evident that the parent state harbors no present
intent of retaking it.3
RECOGNITION AS A POLITICAL FACT
Fundamentally, the political fact of recognition exists when the
government of an established state signifies its unreserved willingness,
either expressly or impliedly, to treat with a new government. Recog-
nition, altho generally de jure, may be simply de facto, in which latter
case there almost invariably follows the political conundrum of de jure
recognition. Recent examples of such a process are recorded in the
de facto recognition of Russia by Great Britain in 1921, followed by
de jure recognition in 1924, and in the de facto recognition of the Car-
ranza Government in Mexico by the United States in 1915, followed
by de jure recognition in 1917. Once made, recognition, whether
de facto or de jure, relates back to the very inception of the new
government.4
"The Unrecognized Government or State in English and American Law"-
Edward D. Dickinson, 22 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW, Part V. The law as to recog-
nized states is well established, but uncertain as to the unrecognized. 25 Co-
LUMBIA LAW REVIEW 544. See also "Effect of Soviet Decrees in American
Courts." 34 YALE L. J. 499.
'Kenneth v. Chambers, (1852), 14 How. 38, 46: the test of recognition is "a
civil government in successful operation." HALi's INTERNATIONAL LAW 8th ed.,
Part 11, Ch. 1. HYDE'S INTERNATIONAL LAW (1922), pp. 55-82. I MOOaE'S INTER-
NATIONAL LAW DIGEST. Sec. 79.
' See 1 MoopR's DIGEST Sec. 72 for definition of recognition. Luther v. Sagor,
37 Times L. R. 777; Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297; Underhill v.
Hernandez, 168 U. S. 250. For redress left open: under treaty provisions see
Oliver American Trading Company v. Government of the United States of
Mexico, (1924) 5 Fed. 11, 659. A recent group of Texas cases follow these
distinctions. See Ramos v. Bartlesville Zinc Co. 275 S. W. 388; Terrazas v.
Holmes, 275 S. W. 392; Terrazas v. Donahue, 275 S. W. 396-all decided in
June, 1925. Also Bradford v. Director-Gen'l of Railways of Mexico, 278 S. W.
251 (Nov. 19, 1925).
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Recognition may arise in a number of ways. Probably the most
common method is thru mere diplomatic communications, as when in
1915 President Wilson recognized the Carranza Government in a let-
ter to the American chargi d'affaires in Mexico.5 One way is thru
the opening of negotiations calculated to lead to the conclusion of a
treaty, as when in 1871 an American consul was instructed by his
government to negotiate a treaty with the Orange Free State., An-
other is thru the accrediting of a diplomatic representative or consular
agent to a new government, as when in 1826 the independence of Peru
was recognized by the appointment of a charge d'affaires by the govern-
ment of the United States.7 Or, it may result from the receiving of a
diplomatic representative from the new government, as when in 1793
the United States received without reservation M. Genet as Minister
from the French Republic." In a few instances recognition has been
accorded by a collective treaty, as when by the Treaty of Berlin of 1878.
Great Britain, Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Russia and Turkey
joined in the recognition of Montenegro, Servia, and Roumania as inde-
pendent states. 9
THE UNRECOGNIZED STATE IN BRINGING SUIT
The early cases of City of Berne v. Bank of England and Taylor v.
Barclay are frequently referred to as having involved the right of un-
recognized states to sue, as well as the status of de facto unrecognized
states in the courts, altho relief was in reality denied plaintiffs in these
suits on purely equitable grounds distinctly aside from the effect of
recognition.' 0 Altho, as a general rule, English and American courts
have bound themselves to the action-or lack of action- of the execu-
tive as regards recognition, and have refused to permit the government
of a new state to bring suit before them in the absence of a political
recognition, there have been instances in which they have undertaken to
take proof of de facto authority."
'SENATE DOCUMENT 324, 64th Congress.
"1. MooRE's DIGEST, 116.
' 1. MOORE's DIGEST, 92.
'1. MooRe'S DIGEST, 122.9Articles 26, 34, and 43, Treaty of Berlin Nouv. Rec. Gen. 2 ser 111, 458, 460.
In the Treaty of Versailles (Br. Cmd. Paper 223), Poland and the Czechoslovak
State were recognized.
"09 Ves. Jr. 348 (1804) and 2 Sim 213 (1828), respectively. See also Dolder v.
Bank of England, 10 Ves. Jr 353 (1805) ; King of Spain v. Oliver, Cir. Court of
Penna. (1810) Fed. case No. 7814, The Hornet (1870) Dist Ct. pf N. C. No.
7814. There is dicta denying the righ to sue in Republic of Honduras v. De
Soto, (1889) 112 N. Y. 310; The Saphire (1871) 11 Wall. 164; Emperor of
Austria v. Day (1861) 3 De G. F. & J. 217.
'Yrissari v. Clement, (1826) 2 Bing. 432; O'Neill v. Central Leather Co.
(1915) 87 N. J. L. 552; United States v. Palmer (1818) 3 Wheat. 610.
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And yet in the recent case of Russian Soviet v. Cibrario,2 which was
brought by the Soviet government in the New York courts to procure
an accounting of Soviet funds deposited in a New York bank by defend-
ant and alleged to have been subjected subsequently to his misappro-
priation, it was held in line with the old rule as expressed in Rose v.
Himely,13 that without having been recognized the court could not under
the principle of comity permit the de facto government to bring suit.
Such a decision, it is submitted, tends to carry functional doctrine
beyond its logical application. Had the Soviet government been at-
tempting to secure or exert control over property of a preceding govern-
ment or of a government with which it was contending, it should have
failed to secure standing in the court, because in deciding title in such
cases a court would in fact be determining a political issue, and in so
doing might embarrass the executive in the carrying out of his policies.1 4
Several Federal courts sitting in admiralty have readily recognized such
a distinction. In the recent cases of The Pensa and The Rodjai the
unrecognized Soviet government was not permitted to enforce property
rights vested in the destroyed regimes that had preceded them.1 5
A distracting effect in the complexities of modern civilization of try-
ing to follow the archaism of delayed recognition, which for obvious3
reasons was quite gratifying to nobilities under the system of the di-
vine right of kings, is evident in The State of Russia v. Lehigh Valley
Railroad Company."6 In that case, begun and prosecuted in 1923 after
the Kerensky government had fallen, by a diplomatic representative of
that government which had been recognized before the fall, to recover
the value of property lost while in the custody of defendant company,
proceedings were permitted to continue to a recovery by plaintiff, al-
though it was evident that the existing government in Russia would
disclaim the activities of that representative on the grounds that they
had not authorized him to act for them. It is highly illogical, at least,
to attempt to adhere to the holding of the court that the representative
who prosecuted the suit really represented the State of Russia because
our State department had recognized no other government than his,
when we recall that one of the fundamental reqluisites of statehood is a
government reasonably stable and actually existent in fact, not merely
in memory.
Such an action as this could have been prosecuted with both the Rus-
sian people and the defendants well protected, by an appointee of the
"235 N. Y. 255 (1923).
"4 Cr. 241 (1808).
"31 YALE L. J. 534.
'277 Fed. 91 (1921), and 278 Fed. 294 (1920).
"293 Fed. 135 (1923).
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court, such as a receiver, with instructions upon its successful culmina-
tion to hold the proceeds in trust until some government of Russia
should be recognized by the President of the United States. 7
THE UNRECOGNIZED STATE AS DEFENDANT
From its position of international eminence, the Permanent Court of
International Justice has shown no inclination to relegate unrecognized
States to a standing before it inferior to that of recognized States.
Rather, in one instance it has already premised its reasoning as a dis-
tinctly contrary assumption of equality. In replying to a request of the
Council of the League of Nations for an opinion concerning the legal
effect of certain treaty provisions in the Treaty of Dorpat between
Finland and Russia, the Court resolutely declined to take jurisdiction,
even in an advisory capacity, inasmuch as Russia had refused to ap-
pear. It should be noted that at that time Russia, aside from not being
a member of the League of Nations, had been recognized only by
Afghanistan, Esthonia, Finland, Germany, Persia, Poland, and Turkey,-
a group forming roughly a mere tenth of the states of the world, and
including but one first-rate power (Germany), which was even then
laboring under heavy international handicaps.
"It is well established in international law," the Court declared, "that
no State can, without its consent, be compelled to submit its disputes
with other States either to mediation or to arbitration or to any other
kind of pacific settlement."'"
Based upon reciprocity and mutual convenience, international law
grants immunity from suit to a sovereign in foreign courts without ex-
pressed submission, even as he reserves it to himself in his own courts.1"
But, as was pertinently remarked in The Pesaro, if the sovereign him-
self give no immunity in his own courts there should be no reason to
invoke the doctrine of comity to protect him in the courts of another
country.20
In the absence, however, of any such disregard of the accepted prac-
tices of international intercourse, immunity from suit is generally con-
sidered as correlative with sovereignty. And so it would seem that in
" Late case comment 23 COLUMBIA L. R. 787; also 25 COLUMBIA L. R. 551.
'PUBLICATION OF THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTIcE, Series
B, No. 1.
"For the history and principle of such immunity see United States v. Lee
(1882) 106 U. S. 196. The Helena (1861) 4 C. Lab. 4 where a vessel had been
confiscated by the Barbary States: "although their notions of internationaljustice differ from those we entertain, we do not on that account venture to call
in question their public acts." See also The Exchange (1812) 7 Cr. 116, and
Kansas v. United States (1907) 204 U. S. 331.
" Note (15) supra. As to the tendency toward exceptions see "Private Claims
against Foreign Sovereigns"--Alfred Hayes, 38 HARVARD L. R. 599.
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Wulfsohn v. Soviet,2' wherein defendant appeared under protest and
secured the vacation of an attachment which had been made upon
certain of its goods for an alleged confiscation of a quantity of plain-
tiff's furs in Russia, service having been had upon a commercial repre-
sentative of the Soviet, the court acted most sensibly. An unrecognized
de facto government should be entitled to the same immunities from
suit that a recognized government would enjoy under the same circum-
stances. Assuredly, recognition cannot create a government any more
than the breaking off of diplomatic relations once established can
abolish it.
22
It goes without saying, that, as was noted in Navkivel v. Omsk All
Russian Government, no action can be brought against a defunct
government. 2 '
In general, the immunity from suit to which a foreign government,
whether recognized or not, is entitled, may be waived by active par-
ticipation of that government in a suit brought against it.24 The best
law in both England and the United States seems to be that even a
general appearance is not a waiver of such right when it is followed by
an answer specifically raising the question of immunity.22 Of course,
a special plea to the jurisdiction effectively raises the privilege of im-
munity.
PRIVATE RIGHTS AS AFFECTED BY THE ACTS OF AN UNRECOGNIZED
GOVERNMENT
Obviously, care must be taken to tread lightly in implying validity to
the acts of any group of irregulars insecurely established. And yet, if,
in fact, a foreign government is found to exist, the courts of no country,
except perhaps those of a jealous parent, can be expected in the face of
private rights to apply a political shibboleth to the acts of the de facto
government within its own territory. To be asked to do so should
startle them to emphatic refusal. The action of the lower court in the
well-known case of A. M. Luther v. James Sagor & Co., 26 it is submit-
"234 N. Y. 372 (1923).
"Underhill v. Hernandez, note (4) supra. The Helena, note (19) supra.
See comment 25 COLUMBIA L. R. 555.
"237 N. Y. (1923).
'Clark v. Barnard (1883) 108 U. S. 436. Porto Rico v. Remas (1914) 232
U. S. 627. See "Waiver of Immunity by a Foreign Sovereign" 33 YALE L. J.
418, for numerous citations. Yet, no affirmative judgment may be recovered by
defendant on a counterclaim against sovereign Plaintiff. Irish Free State v.
Guaranty Safe Deposit Co. 215 N. Y. S. 255, Mch. 13, 1926.
" Duke of Brunswick v. King of Hanover (1844) 6 Beav. 1; The Jassy (1906),
DeSimone v. Transpostes Martimas (1922) 191 N. Y. Supp. 864. The Federal
court held contra in The Sao Vicente (1922) 281 Fed. 811, and (1924) 295
U. S. 829.
" Note (4) supra.
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ted, in disdaining to consider title to certain lumber as having passed in
Russia under a confiscatory decree of the Soviet previous to either de
facto or de jure recognition by the British Government, was decidely
out of harmony with the principle that the acts of a government within
its own territory are not to be questioned by the courts of another
country. If such a decision be set up as criterion, the purchaser of
property subsequent to its confiscation by a de facto government could
maintain his title as against the original holder in a country which had
recognized that government, but would be restrained from doing so in
a country which had not so acted in its political capacity,--regardless on
the one hand of certain detriment to bona fide transferees, and on the
other of impotence to affect the "unrecognized" government, toward
which the political branch might then be unfriendly but not at wary.1
Subject to the decided trend of the American decisions toward the
presumption that the local law under which either party claims is
identical with the lex fori in the absence of proof to the contrary, a
foreign law-when material to the merits of a case-must be specifically
pleaded wherever the lex fori requires other facts under like circum-
stances to be pleaded. 28  According to another principle of Conflict of
Laws, a court should in order to work substantial justice, overlook the
more technical peculiarities of a foreign system of law as compared to
the domestic law.29 This, of course, is fundamental to any functional
appraisement of related acts or transactions occurring in two or more
jurisdictions. Exceptions to the general doctrine requiring the recog-
nition and enforcement by a domestic tribunal of foreign-created
rights may well be applied to recognized and unrecognized governments
alike, for such exceptions merely assert, upon the grounds of equity, that
foreign law should not be considered when the enforcement of rights
created by it would contravene established state policy, tend to disturb
the mores of the people, or subvert the dispensation of justice as con-
ceived in the forum.3
0
A group of cases arising in the Federal courts out of transactions
' 25 COLUMBIA L. R. 549; 22 MICH. L. R. 130; Case Comment 35 HARVARD
L. R. 607 & 619; 31 YALE L. J. 82. For power of an American court to takejurisdiction over contracts made in Russia and providing for exclusive jurisdic.
tion of Russian courts see Sliosberg v. New York Life Insurance Co. (1925)
211 N. Y. S. 270.
'MINOR, CONFLICT OF LAWS, Part VIII, and cases cited. FOOTE, PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 5th ed. Part IV. See Agency of Canadian Car & Foundry
Co. v. American Can Co. (1918) 258 Fed. 152.
MINOR, Part 1. Note (27) supra also.
*°MINOR, Ch. 11. See Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. (1918) 224 N. Y. 99; and
Powell v. Great Northern Railroad Co. (1907) 102 Minn. 448. See also Beale
"The jurisdiction of a Sovereign State," 36 HARVARD L. R. 241, for discussion
and numerous cases.
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which had taken place within the Confederate States during the Civil
War were settled upon these rules, and can, therefore, be utilized, if
indeed they have not since been followed, in adjusting similar difficulties
resulting at the present time from acts done within the territory of non-
recognized de facto governments.3 '
In Baldy v. Hunter,3 2 for example, it was held that transactions not
directed to the furtherance of invasion or insurrection between persons
actually residing within the territory dominated by the Confederate
Government were not invalid because they had taken place under the
sanction of the laws of that government. As was stated in this case, it
logically follows that acts dealing with the preservation of order, the
enforcement of contracts, the celebration of marriages, the punishment
of crimes, the settlement of estates and the transfer and descent of
property, when done under the control of de facto governments existent
in the international world, whether they succeed in maintaining them-
selves perpetually or not, should be valid in the eyes of the courts of
other governments.3 Even under a system of laws different in many
respects from the laws of other states, but enforced and obeyed under
civil penalty over a fixed territory, as in Russia,34 personal rights and
personal status created by the law of such a government even though
unrecognized, should, unless contra bonos mores, be considered as valid
and binding elsewhere."5 As a principle of municipal law, laws pro-
mulgated under a previous r6gime continue even after a change in
sovereignty or in government unless abrogated or modified by competent
legislative authority. 36 The apt words of Chief Justice Marshall in
United States v. Percheman as regards the effect of such change are
applicable to the precepts of our day: "The people change their al-
legiance, their relations to their ancient sovereign are dissolved, but
their relations to each other and their rights of property remain un-
disturbed."3
At best, fictions have served in transitional stages of legal develop-
ment. The extremities to which they can be put are evident in a re-
" Thorington v. Smith, 8 Wall. 1; Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. 176; Limar v.
Micou, 112 U. S. 452.
"171 U. S. 388.
'United States v. Insurance Companies, 22 Wall. 99; Mauran v. Insurance Co.,
6 Wall. 1.
For the Civil Code of Russia see 10 VIRGINIA L. R. 337, and 32 Yale L. R. 779.
""The Soviet Government and Russian Property in Foreign Countries"-
Norman Bertwich, BRITISH Y. B. I. L. (1924) p. 78. Note also The Helena,(19) supra. For the French practice: Pillet Traite pratique de Droit Interna-
tional Privi (1924), ToME 11, Appendice "Des actes de l'etat civil."
"I HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, pp 199-238. See particularly Commonwealth
v. Chapman (1848) 13 Metc. 68.
'7 Peters 51 (1833).
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view of decisions concerned with the effect of certain Soviet decrees
upon the status of Russian corporations possessing branches in foreign
countries. Apparently there has been no accord in the courts outside
Russia as to whether these decrees have merely provided for the con-
fiscation of the Russian assets of the corporations, or have gone so far
as to actually dissolve their legal existence everywhere.38
In a recent English case it was held that they had not dissolved a
branch bank in England, which consequently was permitted to sue and
recover bonds held by a French bank."' In a French case decided in
1922, the fact that the board of directors of a Russian bank nationalized
by such decrees were meeting in France and conducting the affairs of
the bank from that country, was considered as not inconsistent with
the theory that the laws of the old regime had not been displaced by the
Bolshevist revolution. That upheaval, the court maintained, had
operated merely as a force vmjeure in changing the siege of the cor-
poration but not in giving cognizable effect to the change in sovereignty,
or in rendering valid the decrees of the new sovereign, although the
old was defunct.40  On the other hand, the highest court of Switzer-
land has held in a case arising in that country, that the effect of the
decrees had been totally to destroy the legal existence of the Russian
banks, and to render their local assets subject to immediate liquidation.41
As to the United States: In James & Company v. Second Russian
Insurance Company42 the court refused to give effect to such decrees,
and in Russian Insurance Company v. Stoddard held that neither neces-
sity nor justice required the court to consider that such decrees had de-
stroyed the right of plaintiff company to sue before it. For equitable
reasons, however, plaintiff in the latter case was not permitted to re-
cover because, as the court said, injustice might be worked on defend-
ant by a subsequent suit upon the same cause of action in countries
which had recognized the Soviet.4 3
' For comment upon a considerable number of these cases see 37 HARVARD
L. R. 606, BRITISH Y. B. I. L. (1924) p. 78; FOOTE'S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW, 5th ed. p. 658, and 25 COLUMBIA L. R. 564.
"1925 A. C. 112. For the Russian bank cases in England see FOOTE'S PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW pp. 656-661; also BRITISH Y. B. I. L. (1924) p. 78.
'Vlasto c. Banque Russo-Asiatique, Tribunal de Commerce de ]a Seine, 50
Clunet 933. See PILLET, TOME II. Sections 736, 737, 379, 750, 754, particularly
p. 836. "I1 faut naturellement que ces socitfs justifient de leur existence dans
lepays 6tranger ou elles ont 6t6 fondfes." Cass. civ. 7 f6vr. 1912 in Dumas c.
Di~ndoss6 et al., 39 Clunet 871.
"Heusuer c. La Banque International du Commerce de Petrograd (1924)
arret de la Tribunal Federal Swisse, Vol. 50, p. 507.12239 N. Y. 248.
'240 N. Y. 149. See also Joint Stock Co. v. National City Bank of N. Y.,
240 N. Y. 368, wherein it was held that nationalization had not terminated plain-
tiffs' corporate existence.
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Subject to the rule that for certain purposes a corporation may exist
in fact, it would hardly seem that such a body could be extinguished in
the jurisdiction in which it had been created and yet continue to live in
another jurisdiction for an appreciable period of time. If, on the
other hand, a corporation or unincorporated association, be suppressed
in the jurisdiction of its origin only to continue to live by reincorpora-
tion or otherwise under the laws of another jurisdiction, there is no
reason why the continuity of certain of its rights of property under the
laws of a third jurisdiction should be denied.
The English case of Ley v. Lecouturier is in point. There defendant,
who had been made the receiver under the laws of France of an order
of monks subsequent to the Law of Associations dissolving that order
which had possessed patents under English law for a well-known brand
of liquor manufactured under secret process, was enjoined, upon suit
by a representative of the order, which had meanwhile removed to
Spain, from transporting into England the same brand of liquor made
without the secret process. The court observed that the French law
of dissolution could not have been meant to affect in England the rights
of the order, which in reality had continued to live in Spain. 4"
In brief, it is to be expected that once the facts clearly show a foreign
government, however new, to be exerting effective control over a peo-
ple, the courts of all civilized countries will be moved in response to
juristic principles to recognize practically all the private rights arising
under the laws of that government, irrespective of political recognition.
We note with little surprise, then, that in the interesting case of
Kedrovsky v. Rajdesvensky, recently adjudicated, the Appellate Division
of the Supreme Court of New York, in reversing the finding of the
lower court, ousted the appointee ot the Russian Orthodox Church
under the Czarist regime from control of the property of that church in
the United States, despite his resistance and protest, and established in
his place a new appointee holding a commission issued by the reorganized
church in Russia then functioning under the Soviet Government.4-
"1910 A. C. 262. For discussion of this case see FooTE's PRIVATE INTER-
NATIONAL LAW, 5th ed. p. 656.
" N. Y. Sp. T. Sup. Ct., 1924; reported reversed in 212 N. Y. Supp. 273.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol12/iss2/3
